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CHAPTER 1 
Soil and land degradation 
In the field of soil movement, New Zealand is a world leader.1 The nation's youthful ruggedness, 
its steep hills and mountains, its active glaciers and frequent earthquakes, its bracing winds, and its 
torrential storms all contribute to exceptionally dynamic soil. But natural factors are only the 
beginning. Deforestation and introduced plants and animals -legacies of human settlement - have 
accelerated the process. 
Small amounts of soil move almost continuously, displaced by moderate rains or winds. However, 
the majority of soil movement is due to extreme storms or winds. Both the continuous and the 
extreme ·events cause losses of fertile topsoils and accretion of unwanted sediment, but only the 
extreme events cause· sudden and pronounced structural changes as well - large gullies, sediment 
fans, and landslips or slides that expose gaping scars. The structural changes are particularly 
worrisome. Affected land can quickly become unsuitable for further cultivation or pastoral use, and 
its stabilisation can be quite expensive. 
Infrequent, large-scale movements of soil cause the greatest damages both on- and off-site. The 
large losses may occur only once or twice in many decades and are easily overlooked in annual land 
management decisions. Even very conservative soil management plans are vulnerable to ill-timed 
episodes. 
The very nature of soil movement presents challenges. The phenomenon is widespread and affects 
many people. It is also complex, with obscure causes and consequences. The underlying processes 
work cumulatively over long periods. Soil movement is extremely difficult to measure outside the 
laboratory, and widespread monitoring would be prohibitively expensive. The physical circumstances 
vary greatly from place to place, as do the appropriate remedies. 
Soil movement is a social concern, first, because it tends to reduce natural productivity (Crosson and 
Stout, 1983). The reduction sometimes can be offset with fertilisers, irrigation, and other inputs, 
but the added costs are a loss to society unless they are exceeded by the costs of prevention. Second, 
displaced soil impinges on other resources. It smothers seed beds and destroys crops, clogs ditches 
and streams, displaces water storage capacity in lakes and reservoirs, and degrades aquatic ecosystems 
(Clark et aL, 1985). 
The government of New Zealand has a long history of encouraging agriculture and land settl~ment.2 
As part of these policies, various programs also encouraged soil conservation. In recent years, 
however, the Crown has withdrawn to a very large extent from its previous support for agriculture, 
. with soil conservation being one of the few exceptions (Sandrey and Reynolds, 1990). Now soil 
1 
2 
For an overview see: Murray and Ackroyd (1979), Adams (1980), 800ns and Selby (1982), and Griffiths (1981). 
See generally Jourdain (1925), McCaskill (1973), National Water and Soil Conservation Authority (1987) and the summary 
in Ackroyd (1990, pp.2-7). 
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conservation policies are being reconsidered (National Water and Soil Conservation Authority, 1987; 
Homer, 1990). 
This publication assesses government involvement in soil conservation, including the reasons for and 
against it, policy instruments that are available, and the roles of central and regional governments. 
The discussion applies only to soil conservation on private lands -those not directly held by 
government. 
The discussion begins with a definition of the public interest in soil conservation. The context within 
which policies must be evaluated is then described and specific policy options are assessed. The 
assessment emphasises economic issues. While there are no prescriptions, there are conclusions 
about the policies that seem most sensible. 
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CHAPTER 2 
The public interest and public policies 
2.1 Two goals 
Conserving soil is an accepted goal in most developed nations, for two reasons. One reason is to 
ensure that ample soil remains available to sustain agricultural production capacity and meet future 
food and fibre needs: . the other is to reduce the off-site damages caused by displaced soil. 
These broad justifications are easy to accept; making them operational is much more difficult. How 
much agricultural capacity is enough, and can it be sustained by fertilisation rather than 
conservation? What are the 'future needs' and what obligations do present citizens have to provide 
them? How should unmeasurable considerations be weighed against those that can be measured? 
Should the public sector be directly involved in soil management, or should it simply facilitate 
private decisions? If it is to be directly involved, should government encourage or regulate? Should 
its involvement come primarily at the local or national level? Different stances on these issues can 
lead to very different conclusions about whether and how government should promote soil 
conservation. 
2.2 Past policies in New Zealand 
Successive New Zealand governments for many years subsidised and protected agriculture (Sandrey 
and Reynolds, 1990). One form of support was soil conservation assistance (see the Soil 
Conservation and Rivers Control Act, 1941). Drawing on national tax revenues and local rate funds, 
catchment boards provided communities and individuals with technical and financial assistance for 
conservation practices. Project costs were also shared by landholders. The assistance has gone more 
toward protecting soil quality or preventing off-site damages depending on the government 
philosophy of the moment (Ackroyd, 1990). 
In the restructuring moves of 1987-90, catchment board activities were absorbed by regional councils 
(National Water and Soil Conservation Authority, 1987; Homer, 1990). The restructuring requires 
regional leadership in catchment works and reduces the programmatic involvement of central 
government 
In addition to direct assistance, special tax provisions encouraged resource conservation investments 
by farmers. Tax code changes in recent years have cut out most of the special inducements (see for 
example Tyler and Lattimore (1990». 
Central government also supported data development, research, and other essential knowledge and 
infrastructure for soil conservation (Jakobsson, 1986). This involvement continues within an 
environment of increased contestability and reduced security of funding (Parliamentary 
Commissioner for the Environment, 1988). 
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Other government programs have sometimes thwarted New Zealand's soil conservation efforts. For 
many years, central government cleared public land, seeded it for agricultural uses, then leased or 
sold it to 'balloteers' on concessionary terms (McCaskill, 1973). Much of the balloted land was 
highly vulnerable to degradation. Much of it was remote or otherwise economically marginal. 
Water d~velopment schemes required low grazing intensity or bush cover in certain areas (for 
example, Department of Lands and Survey, 1977), but the consequence nonetheless has been more 
fragile land in risky uses. 
Disaster assistance has been another influential policy (Dickinson and Sandrey, 1986; Trotter, 1988). 
Central government has regularly provided financial, material, and technical relief following storms, 
droughts, and seismic events. The assistance has been particularly beneficial to pastoral activities 
in areas with high risk of drought, land slips, and erosion. Landholders have in effect received 
disaster insurance without charge. Much of the land could not generate enough income to sustain 
the costs of preventing or recovering from disasters and would probably revert to bush or be put into 
forestry if public dis.aster assistance was withdrawn. 
Taken together, the conservation, settlement, and disaster relief policies have been costly for 
taxpayers and the economy. While some landholders and commodity merchants have benefitted, the 
policies have increased and retained vulnerable land in risky uses and have reduced landholder 
incentives to manage resource degradation risks. 
2.3 Policies in other countries 
Many nations have voluntary soil conservation programs aimed primarily at farmers. The usual 
approach is to disseminate information, offer technical assistance, and provide part of the cost of 
conservation measures. 
In recent years, the voluntary approach has been widely Criticised.3 The many dollars spent and 
many farmers helped have not produced equivalent resource protection. Part of the problem is that 
conservation and other programs help to sustain the very land uses that put the land at risk. 
Another part is that .the programs have emphasised protection of productivity for the future when 
correcting off-site problems has a more compelling justification. 
The Criticisms have led to new approaches (see generally Braden and Lovejoy (1990); some involve 
regulations. In many parts of the United States, for example, soil must be confined and stabilised 
during construction projects in order to keep soil off neighbouring properties and out of water 
bodies. Some states have gone ~ far as to set erosion standards for farmland in order to retain 
fertile soils.4 In Denmark, manure spreading is restricted and fertiliser management plans and 
nutrient-using autumn cover crops are required (Dubgaard, 1990). 
3 
4 
For criticisms of New Zealand policy see: The. Treasury (1984). For criticisms of United States policies see: Braden and 
Vchtmann (1982-83), Williams (1979), United States Comptroller General (1983), C1ark et al (1985), and Strohbehn 
(1986). 
The states of Illinois, Iowa, Ohio and South Dakota have erosion control laws for farmland. 
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Other approaches involve forceful incentives. An example is Conservation Compliance in the United 
States (United States Department of Agriculture, 1986). Farmers who have erosion-prone fields or 
wetlands must adopt and implement conservation practices or be ineligible for certain types of 
government benefits. Thus, benefit eligibility carries a higher price. The motives for this policy 
include both productivity protection and off-site damage mitigation, as well as providing a stronger 
rationale for government assistance to farmers. Another example of incentives is Sweden's fertiliser 
tax that aims to reduce nutrient pollution (Kumm, 1990). 
In addition to the new strategies, tactical changes are evident. Soil conservation initiatives are 
increasingly being considered from a regional perspective, as befits off-site problems. Sweden has 
refashioned extension programs to address entire watersheds (ibid.). Australia's Murray-Darling 
Basin Compact (Musgrave, 1990) and LandCare program (Government of Victoria, 1988) exemplify 
regional approaches to water and salinity management 
The restrictive policies are particularly important, because they explicitly change property rights. 
The fact that they have been justified both to protect future citizens' access to productive soils and 
to protect current citizens from soil pollution is interesting because of landholders' very different 
positions with respect to the two goals. 
Upon closer examination, however, there are important differences in restrictive policies. The 
United States' construction requirements and Denmark's manure controls are the most restrictive, 
and both deal with pollution. The policies that attempt to protect productivity are either voluntary 
(the United States encumbrance of farm benefits) or enforced only when government helps with the 
costs (state erosion restrictions). 
The recent developments reflect wide-ranging changes in public attitudes toward soil conservation -
less reliance on VOluntary action; greater interest in off-site consequences; decentralisation of 
policies and programs; sharpening of the policy instruments to make programs more effective; and 
increased willingness to get tough with resource degradation, rather than simply encourage voluntary 
conservation. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Property rights and soil management 
3.1 Property rights 
Property rights are entitlements to make certain types of choices. An absolute property right in 
land, for example, would allow the owner to use that land in any imaginable way. Some property 
rights are enshrined in constitutional law, others in civil law, and still others have evolved in 
common law.s 
While a proPerty right confers a certain autonomy and freedom of choice, it also implies boundaries 
where the choices of one person give way to the choices of others. That is, attendant to a property 
right are certain duties and obligations not to use the right in ways that harm or interfere with the 
rights of others. 
Private landholders in most times and places have exercised absolute rights over the management 
of soil. This rights structure has very different consequences for maintaining productivity and 
minimising off-site impacts. 
3.2 Property rights and productivity 
Future citizens have no more legal standing than current citizens give them, so there is no legal basis 
for a claim that current landholders have a duty to provide for the future. Thus, duties and 
obligations are confined in time .. 
However, landholders have a direct financial interest in the future condition of their land. Better 
tended soil should sell for a higher price or provide advantage for one's heirs. Thus, landholders' 
economic self-interests are consistent with the goal of protecting productivity (Crosson and 
Stout, 1983; McConnell, 1983). The main requirements are, first, that landholders are assured of 
realising the future value of their land and, second, that the land market provides good information 
about the quality of land parcels and the relationship of soil quality to future productivity.6 
5 
6 
Only the latter two forms of rights are present in New Zealand, which has no constitution. 
For empirical evidence on the value of land quality in the United States, see ElVin and Mill (1985) and Palmquist and 
Danielson (1989). 
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3.3 Property rights and otT-site impacts 
The virtues of self-interest in safeguarding future productivity have no counterparts when it comes 
to off-site impacts. Soil dischargers typically have only a small stake in the outcome. Property 
values wilJ increase little if at all from abatement,7 unless it is widely undertaken, and abatement 
rarely generates revenues.s 
While direct self-interest fails, it would seem that the duties and obligations associated with property 
rights surely extend to the off-site consequences of soil management. Victims clearly have standing 
to claim damage compensation through common law litigation. The threat of such actions should 
induce precautions by landholders. But a closer look reveals this approach to be a mirage. It fails 
because of the costliness of establishing cause and effect and bringing the parties together. 
Liability could be a very effective remedy when the problem is well defined and the parties are small 
in number and easily engaged. Then, the costs of undertaking a tort action may not be unreasonable 
compared to the possible benefits, and the visibility of the participants will ease the apportionment 
of the costs. The unpleasantness of neighbours suing one another, however, is likely to discourage 
many from pursuing recourse. 
More generally, land-based pollution arises from multiple sources and affects many people. Each 
victim would reap only a small share of the benefits from abatement and has an interest in shifting 
the costs of litigating onto others. Each polluter is practically immune from being detected because 
so many nearly-indistinguishable sources are involved. These realities undercut common law 
protection. 
It is certainly true that these endemic problems could be diminished through the application of 
appropriate doctrines of liability.9 Strict liabi~ity fits instances in which pollution is an aberration 
and victims are relatively powerless to prevent damages. Such liability has been upheld in a number 
of environmental torts.10 Because of the inevitability of some land-based pollution, negligence 
(standard of care) seems to be a more plausible doctrine. But, since victims can often anticipate off-
site impacts and take some precautions. (such as not building on flood plains), a contributory 
negligence standard could reasonably be applied. 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Exceptions arise, for crample, when farm chemicals pollute an aquifer that serves as the farm water source and when eroded 
soil fills the farm drainage ditches. In these cases, the costs and benefits are internalised to a large degree within the farm 
enterprise. 
Government subsidies are sometimes offered to cover part of the costs, but they generally do not make abatement 
profitable. Landholders could offer their abatement services on the open market in order to realise a profit, but rarely are 
victims of land-based pollution well enough organised to purchase those services. 
See generally Rubin (1977), Polinsky (1980) and Shavell (1984). 
Boomer v. Atlantic Cemeni Co. 26 N.Y. 2d 219, 257 N.E. 2d 870. 309 N.Y.S. 2d 312 (1970); Walker v. Weedoir (N.Z) 
Limited [1959] NZLR 777. See also discussion in DAR. WILLIAMS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 222-233 (1980). 
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A more vexing aspect of the liability regime is the involvement of many parties on both sides of a 
particular conflict. Because the perpetrators cannot easily be singled out, liability would have to be 
joint and severa1.11 That is, all potential culprits would have to be liable as a class, irrespective 
of their specific contributions. This structure treats the good and the bad alike, and in so doing, 
creates incentives for self-policing within the class. But it also creates costly and time-consuming 
~angling over criteria for inclusion and over division of responsibility among defendants. 
The involvement of many victims suggests that class actions should have legal standing. Once again, 
however, criteria for inclusion and for distributing the financial risk can be costly and contentious. 
With such problems of organising a case and developing sound information, even under creative 
liability doctrines, the costs would be prohibitive unless large damages are at stake. But, the physical 
harms associated with land-based pollution typically are not of the life-threatening or heart-rending 
sorts that lead to large awards. Only in rare instances would the benefits be worth the costs. This 
fact undercuts the common law incentives for landholders to guard against off-site effects and leaves 
all of the incentives for precaution on the victims. 
Some commentators argue that continuing off-site impacts are prima facie evidence that the costs 
of disciplining private actions exceed the value - that the equilibrium allocation of resources within 
a given set of property rights is efficient even though it includes external impacts (Buchanan and 
Stubblebine, 1962; Buchanan, 1972; Sammuels, 1971 and 1972). Surely some externalities are not 
worth correcting under any circumstances. But this misses the point and ends up in a tautology. 
The structure of rights frequently throws all of the disciplinary ('transactions') costs on one side -
in this case, the side of the pollution victims (Dahlman, 1979; Bromley, 1978). If these costs are 
systematically greater for the parties on one side than for those on the other, then different 
structures can produce very different outcomes, anyone of which would be 'efficient' within its 
context. The issue the~ is the structure of rights, not merely the absence of transactions within a 
given structure. 
A case can be made for organising rights so that the onus of correcting misallocations is on the side 
that can do it most cheaply (Calabresi and Melamed, 1972). In the instant case, for example, it. 
might be cheaper to protect victims by enforcing land use or water quality standards but allow 
individual landholders to gain the agreement of nearby residents to less stringent requirements. 
3.4 Civil law alternatives 
Where common law remedies are very costly, slow, and, consequently, incomplete, civil law may be 
a better alterative. Government defines or asserts specific rights, duties, and obligations and 
undertakes their defence. This, of course, is also costly, and it can cause resource misallocation by 
forcing disparate situations to adhere to a single· set of requirements.12 Furthermore, civil laws 
11 
12 
Segerson (1988). However, she assumes the ability to differentiate poliuters' relative contributions to off-site conditions. 
See also TIetenberg (1989). 
This can be avoided to some extent by allowing latitude in the application of civil laws. 
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can be criticised as arbitrary, uncompensated seizures of private property rights.13 In some cases, 
however, the distortions of civil law remedies may be less than the distortions arising when common 
law is called upon to do a job for which it is ill suited. Child labour, driving, and prophylactic 
quarantine laws are good examples. 
Most nations have laws establishing explicit rights to a clean, healthy environment. The effect is to 
uphold through the enforcement powers of the state certain duties and obligations that could easily 
be ignored in the course of economic activity that is incompletely accountable through common law 
remedies. 
To date, these laws generally have had the greatest impacts on industrial activities and the disposal 
of solid and sanitary wastes. Land-based activities have been subject to zoning laws that, among 
other things, typically govern household waste disposal options. Land-based pollution of the non-
. point source type has only begun to receive civil law recognition. 
Policies embedded in civil laws are implemented through some combination of: 
_ economic incentives; 
_ regulations; 
_ education and persuasion; and 
_ administered markets. 
Complementing these instruments are indicators designed to gauge whether policy Objectives are 
being achieved. 
Economic incentives are created through subsidies, tax provisions, charges, fines, and liability 
(insurance). They alter the benefits and costs of various choices that are available to individuals but 
do not prescribe outcomes. In contrast, regulations specify outcomes by setting standards, issuing 
directives, or requiring permits. They directly confine choices. Education and persuasion aim to 
change individuals' perceptions of their own self-interest. The principal vehicle is public 
information. Administered markets allow private transactions over goods and services not otherwise 
captured in the market place. Government is more closely involved in administered markets than 
in normal markets because the goods - such as clean air - have Special characteristics that are not 
easily reduced to individual property rights. 
Many public initiatives combine instruments. For example, administrative markets are actually a 
combination of quotas, established by regulation, and incentives, created by allowing quota rights 
to be bought and sold. Another example is the use of penalties to reinforce regulations. 
13 Anderson and Hide (1989). See also Knetsch (1983). The argument in a nutshell is that compensation would assure that 
the beneficiaries value the rights at least as much as those whose rights are seized. But, the common situation is that the 
duties and obligations attendant to rights are not being obsetved and common law remedies are too costly. Compensation 
would effectively have 'beneficiaries' paying to restore the rights that they are supposedly guaranteed anyway by the duties 
and obligations incumbent on, but ignored by, those whose rights are being 'seized'. For differing views, see Bromley 
(1989). 
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CHAPTER 4 
Soil conservation policies for New Zealand 
The following sections include discussion of possible directions for government policy toward soil 
movement. This discussion is warranted by doubts about the adequacy of common law remedies to 
resolve particularly the off-site impacts of soil management. To be clear, however, I do not claim 
that civil law remedies are clearly superior or necessary; such a claim would require empirical 
support that is simply.beyond obtaining. But, empirical support for the adequacy of common law 
is equally unavailable. It is a matter of political judgement whether the gaps in common law require 
filling with civil law. And this judgement must take into account the consequences for liberty, 
individual security, and compensation - values that market and common law solutions generally 
uphold. 
4.1 Laissez faire 
One approach for government is to withdraw from programs that affect conservation incentives and 
to rely instead on market forces and common law remedies to determine the extent of conservation. 
This would not preclude non-government organisations from engaging in conservation (or 
degradation), owning and administering conservation areas, entering into conservation agreements 
with landholders, and so forth; it would simply remove government. 
Laissez faire would give full expression to property rights and common law remedies. Self-interested 
landholders would safeguard soil quality according to their reading of its future value and prevent 
off-site effects to the extent dictated by the (meagre) threat of damage claims. 
There are secondary considerations. One is that asset values would change. Land that stood to . 
benefit from government programs would be reduced in value in their absence, and vice versa for 
land restricted by government programs. Land that has inherent productivity and stability 
advantages would rise in value relative to fragile and low quality land. The economic positions of 
individuals and regions would rise and fall with these changes. 
Another secondary consideration concerns basic information and research within a laissez faire 
system. General information on the natural resource stock has limited private value but much 
public value. Individuals are unlikely to contribute voluntarily toward the compilation of this 
information. The situation is analogous for basic research, much of which increases public 
knowledge without directly resulting in marketable products. Government provision of basic natural 
resource information and research is widely accepted as necessary. 
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4.2 Education and technical assistance 
Many nations, New Zealand included, have programs designed to inform landholders about soil 
conservation advantages and techniques. Some landholders also receive design and implem~ntation 
assistance. Various studies have analysed the importance of education and technical assistance in 
promoting conservation (for example Cambeni et aL (1990), Ervin and Ervin (1982) and Van Es 
(1983). 
These measures appeal to landholders' self-interest in protecting asset values. By encouraging 
landholders to consider seriously the value of conservation, public education efforts may be a 
worthwhile supplement to market incentives. On the other hand, the conservation consequences 
of these voluntary programs are frequently short-lived (United States Department of 
Agriculture, 1980). 
Government is not be the only source of conservation information and assistance. Professional farm 
consultants and technical services already provide soil management expertise. Government 
education efforts might reach further if directed at the providers of these services - realtors, insurers, 
lenders, and consultants - with the aim of building soil conservation considerations into lending, real 
estate, and management transactions. 
Education and assistance have less to offer for off-site problems. Off-site problems often call for 
coordinated action by several landholders, but voluntary programs lead to uneven uptake; many 
landholders avoid involvement with government programs or do not want to hear that they are 
contributing to off-site impacts. A way around this would be to offer greater assistance for groups 
prepared to take coordinated action - this is the concept of the LandCare Program in Australia 
(Government of Victoria, 1988), and has long been a feature of the United States Soil Conservation 
Service's Small Watershed Programme (Lea and Mattson, 1974). Nevertheless, uneven results can 
be expected as long as the programs are voluntary. 
4.3 Facilitation 
If distortionary policies of the past encouraged intensive use of fragile lands, then remOVed of those 
policies should eventually result in reversion of much of that land to less intensive uses. Ordinarily, 
the reversion would happen in a patchwork pattern. Individual landholders would reach different 
conclusions at different times. A result could be slow adjustment that fails to accentuate the 
economic comparative advantage of a region.14 
Some analysts suggest that government could facilitate the transition and promote synergies that 
would enhance future prospects (King, 1990). This might be done through speeding up land re-
titling, adjusting surveying criteria, reducing stamp duties, and operating a clearing house for 
information (Steele, K., Ministry for the Environment, 1990, pers. comm.). Government could even 
buy and redevelop land (King, 1990). 
14 King (1990). See also the related studies: A1dwell (1989), McIntosh (1989), and Centre for Community Initiatives (1989). 
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There is little doubt that government policies and procedures can affect economic development and 
land use. But, the virtue of this approach is less clear. Private interests can go far toward 
promoting change. They have a comparative advantage in generating ideas and bearing the risk of 
investments. By working with those interests, government can foster cohesive development while 
capitalising on the special talents of the private sector. Through rating or infrastructure 
development, government can encourage certain types of change, again, without supplanting private 
interests. 
4.4 Subsidies 
In many nations, governments have subsidised certain types of conservation measures without 
contractual assurances of future performance.1S This approach invites diversion of public funds 
to non-conservative uses, and it promotes one-off measures where s~tained practices are needed. 
Rather than subsidising specific land use measures, government could reward actual improvements 
in land or water quality. This would promote the actual objectives rather than contributing factors. 
But, the improvements would typically take many years, and the rewards would have to be large and 
assured in order to attract the interest and investment of landholders or communities. 
No matter how cleverly organised they are, subsidy schemes have perverse consequences. They 
encourage beneficiaries to make things look bad initially so that the rewards of improvement can 
be achieved easily. Accountability is difficult - people seek the funds for purposes only tenuously 
related to the program. And subsidies keep more of the problem-causing enterprises in business and 
seeking assistance. 
4.5 Purchasing rights 
Government could pay landholders to give up rights to certain land uses. This is common in 
practice. For certain types of conservation measures, government assistance depends on a multI-year 
contractual agreement during which the landholder gives up (sells for the price of the assistance) 
the rights to manage in ways that are inconsistent with the conservation measures. 
This approach could be expanded in duration and scope. For example, landholders might be paid 
for accepting deed covenants that permanently disallow plou~g or grazing near a stream. 
While continuity with past policy and opportunities for landholders are advantages of purchasing 
rights, past drawbacks would also be manifest. A comprehensive policy would be very costly, and 
a less comprehensive policy would be piecemeal. The government could also end up owning lots 
of rights that it could not effectively administer. 
15 For comments on New Zealand's experience, see Hide and Sharp (1987). See also United States Department of 
Agriculture (1980). 
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4.6 Cross-compliance 
Rather than giving outright subsidies, government might use other government benefits to reward 
those who practice conservation or attain certain levels of land or water quality. Disaster relief for 
farmers is the obvious (and perhaps the only) remaining benefit in New Zealand that might be 
. encumbered. 
Large scale natural disasters present a major challenge to representative government. It cannot 
stand idle in the face of serious and highly visible losses to large groups. Rather, it responds with 
assistance. . 
By acting as an insurer, government reduces private incentives to manage the risks. It also undercuts 
the development of a private market for disaster insurance. It is not clear that government has any 
comparative advantage as an insurer. But, if government disaster relief is unavoidable, there may 
at least be ways of structuring it so that landholders and regions manage more of the risk of soil 
movement. 
One approach would be to have several levels of disaster coverage: the lowest level for all 
individuals or regions without condition to fulfil the expectation that government will provide some 
type of assistance; higher levels for those who have protected themselves against losses. Eligibility 
for higher benefits might depend, for individual landholders, on implementation of certified soil 
management plans. Communities might be eligible for aid if they are following an approved soil and 
water management plan or maintain more than a specified level of per capita expenditure on 
resource protection. 
Use of disaster assistance in this way would loosely follow the example of the Conservation 
Compliance program in the United States (Farnsworth et al, 1988). This program affects all farmers 
who cultivate land classified as 'highly erodible', plus certain other lands. To be eligible for 
agriculture program benefits (including several types of de facto insurance), the farmers must 
establish and comply with a conservation plan. The plan must be approved by the United States Soil 
Conservation Service. 
For cross-compliance to work, there would have to be a credible threat of receiving only the basic 
disaster benefits. Otherwise, landholders or communities would have little incentive to qualify for 
higher coverage. Credibility is established most persuasively through experience and observation. 
But, with disasters, experience and observation are sporadic. Thus, credibility would depend on a 
convincing political consensus. Advanced coverage options would have to be sufficiently attractive 
to overcome doubts. 
Cross-compliance would probably increase government fiscal exposure. Higher levels of disaster 
assistance would probably mean higher total disaster payouts. The payouts would be difficult to 
anticipate and budget for because they are occasioned by the vicissitudes of nature. Binding 
contracts with individuals or communities would leave government less able to protect its budget 
by trading off the size of p~yments against the scope of the disaster. Of course, the risk of high 
payouts could be spread in a secondary insurance market or absorbed in a revolving trust account. 
Another danger would be the undercutting of both conservation and disaster incentives. This 
possibility always threatens when a single policy instrument (disaster assistance) is aimed at multiple 
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objectives (insurance and conservation). Landholders who are unwilling to undertake conservation 
might opt out of the disaster assistance that they really need. Or, serious conservation problems 
might occur on land where disasters are not a big concern. Only where the need for disaster 
insurance is highly correlated with the presence of conservation problems is cross compliance likely 
to be very effective. 
4.7 Rates 
A bigger step away from pure subsidies would be the use of punitive incentives. An obvious 
mechanism is to levy higher rates for degraded land or land that is yielding pollution in order to 
increase the cost of degradation and thereby discourage it. 
This approach has more to offer for pollution than for loss of land quality. Rates are (loosely) 
justified by the value of public services received, and pollution is essentially the use of a public 
service (waste disposal). A rate factor that reflects the cost of dealing with the waste would be 
consonant with the philosophy of rates. On the other hand, the public and private impacts of 
productivity loss are (nearly) the same, so the public service rationale does not apply. 
In practice, adding a pollution-impact component would further complicate the already complex and 
politically volatile rate system. Furthermore, the intended incentives would probably be lost by 
combining this component with others in the overall rate. 
4.8 Regulations and fines 
An even more forceful approach would be to regulate land use and levy penalties for violations. 
New Zealand" law allow for regulation of land" use for the purpose of soil and water conservation 
(Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Amendment Act, 1959 ss. 34, 35). Government can place 
temporary or permanent restrictions on individual landowners in the public interest. In reality, 
however, these regulations have rarely been used (Steele, K., pers. comm.). 
Regulations limit private rights. Government's power to regulate stems either from the absolute 
powers of the sovereign, as in New Zealand, or from its powers to safeguard public order and well-
being. 
Insofar as regulations usurp rights previously held by individuals, they take things of value. 
Compensation for losses ensures that the rights are worth at least as much to the beneficiaries of 
regulation as to those being regulated (Anderson and Hide, 1989; Knetsch, 1983). Without 
compensation, there is no such assurance. 
In some cases, however, regulations essentially lend government authority to existing duties and 
obligations that are not enforceable through common law. For example, many environmental 
regulations essentially assert civil law protections for duties and obligations that have proven too 
cumbersome to enforce through common law remedies. They substitute administrative enforcement 
for liability proceedings. Such uses of regulations cannot really be said to reduce private rights; 
rather, they provide different means of enforcing existing rights (Braden, 1982). In these 
circumstances, compensation has little justification. 
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Regulation is fundamentally an er ante effort to anticipate and prevent problems. It is part and 
parcel of the 'planning approach' to governance. In contrast, fines and liability are er post 
instruments that come into play only after problems occur. They create incentives to avoid problems 
without creating elaborate and time-consuming government machinery to scrutinise every possible 
source of trouble. Both approaches have shortcomings, which is why combining them can sometimes 
work better than either alone (Kolstad et al, 1990). 
A system of regulations and fines for on-site degradation would require criteria for reasonable rates 
of land quality change or appropriate uses.16 These judgements are made everyday in urban areas 
through zoning and the criteria are set and enforced without compensation. However, relatively few 
nations extend zoning to rural areasP The apparent premise is that lower intensity and greater 
homogeneity of rural uses breeds fewer conflicts. Moreover, with respect to future productivity, the 
fact that future claimants have no legal standing undermines the rationale for zoning-type 
intervention. 
Nevertheless, some nations systematically regulate land use in rural areas (Grossman and Broussard, 
1988). Land use compatibility is one rationale. An alleged public interest in the aesthetic quality 
of the countryside is another. Within New Zealand, for example, interest has been expressed in 
encouraging plantation forests to be structured in ways that create more diverse and interesting 
vistas (for example, O'Connor, 1986). It might be argued that landslips and gullies promoted by 
unwise land uses violate aesthetic sensibilities and should be prevented through regulation. 
The legitimacy of a public interest in aesthetic quality is certainly open to debate. The point here, 
notwithstanding the sweeping provisions of New Zealand's soil and water conservation law (Soil 
Conservation and Rivers Control Amendment Act, 1959 ss. 34, 35), is that this is one of the few 
justifications for regulating land uses because of on-site impacts. Doing so might prevent the most 
egregious degradation, or at least provide civil recourse when it occurs. But, it also raises the 
question of compensation, reduces security of landholder rights, and may increase the costs of soil-
intensive products. These consequences may in some cases be counterproductive. . 
With respect to off-site impacts in rural areas, conflict and heterogeneous interests are obvious: The 
dispersed nature of the conflicts provides plausible grounds for civil law intervention. 
Ideally, regulations aimed at off-site impacts would be based on the quality of the envjronment. 
Criteria would be set for water quality, and violators would be penalised. However, individuals often 
do not know how their actions contribute to ambient conditions, so they would not know how to 
respond to regulations based on those conditions. . 
Government has two ways of dealing with uncertainty about the relationship between emissions and 
ambient conditions. One would leave it to the landholders to resolve. If the expected fines are large 
enough, it would be in the landholders' interest to investigate the relationships. The other approach 
would be for government to investigate and then to translate the ambient criteria into emission 
16 
17 
In the United States, states that regulate soil erosion employ the 'Universal Soil Loss Equation' (Wischmeier and 
Smith, 1977). Erosion standards are set, but compliance is based on whether the equation indicates that the farming 
methods being used would generally attain the specified standards, not whether they actually .attain the standards in a 
particular situation. To apply this approach in New Zealand would require good predictive relationships for New Zealand 
conditions, and these are presently unavailable (Steele, 1990). 
For an exception, see Grossman and Broussard (1988) on the Netherlands. 
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criteria for individual landholders. Because of the difficulty of measuring emissions, however, the 
criteria would probably have to specify land uses - like Denmark's requirements for nutrient 
management (Dubgaard, 1990), or perhaps pesticide use restrictions or filter strip requirements near 
water courses. 
A basic problem with regulations and fines is the fractional chance of being caught for violations. 
The consequence is that landholders or communities have less incentive to comply. The policy 
choice is between primitive fines (a cost to violators) and more enforcement (a cost to government) 
(Polinsky, 1980). 
In contrast to rates, fines get around the need for continual and systematic reassessments of land 
uses, land quality, or water quality. Enforcement can be based on self-reporting, spot checks, and 
complaints, as is the case with most environmenial regulations. Since the reason for the fine would 
. be very clear, it would send a clearer message to landholders than would an adjustment in rates. 
4.9 Transferable permits18 
A permit scheme for erosion (and perhaps for fertiliser and pesticide application) would specify a 
given rate of loss (use). Landholders who want to use the land more erosively would be required 
to buy more permits from those who can use the land with less erosion. 
This approach has a serious flaw when applied to soil movemenL Compliance would have to be 
based on long-term land use plans (so all land uses would have to be continually monitored and 
recorded). But, if permits can be exchanged, the land use plans also can change. So, there is no 
sound basis for determining at a point in time whether the individual is complying with his or her 
long-term plan. The scheme also implies equivalency of erosion from area to area, but the 
consequences for both productivity and off-site effects can differ greatly. 
While an erosion scheme seems implausible, transferable permitS might work for fertilisers and 
pesticides. In these cases, total use is an important element (although not the only determinant) 
of environmental impact. A transferable permit system might limit the use while allowing market 
forces to allocate it. 
An input or emission scheme has obvious limitations as a way for dealing with off-site effects. A 
pollutant load scheme would be better. But, land-based emissions do not have a fixed relationship 
to loadings, so the effects of transfers between landholders cannot readily be anticipated. 
18 See generally Tietenberg (1985). Applicability to non-point source pollution is suggested by Harrington et aJ. (1985). 
16 
4.10 Conclusions 
Government has many tools available for promoting soil and water conservation. In the past, it has 
relied on VOluntary and unfocused efforts. Regulations have been available but almost entirely 
unused. The result has been sporadic, uneven, and has enjoyed only short-lived success. 
Government policies toward soil and water conservation should align more closely with public 
justifications of their capabilities. Protecting productivity is in the landholder's interest to a 
significant degree. Government policy should build on those interests rather than substituting for 
them. Providing good information and research to landholders and their support industries makes 
sense. Cross-compliance with disaster relief makes sense. Facilitating economic change makes 
sense. But, regulatory intervention does not make sense unless there is a clear case of a public 
threat in the way land is being used~ 
When there are such threats, as with impacts on receiving waters, more forceful steps are justified 
and often required because of common law limitations. An essential first step is to clarify what 
constitutes unacceptable impacts of soil and land management. Then, it makes sense to enhance 
access to common law remedies by expanding the liability doctrines that enable tortious relief. It 
makes sense to have regulatory powers available for use in situations where private or common law 
remedies are inadequate. And, it makes sense to have penalties for abuses that encourage 
landholders to see prevention as being in their own best interest. 
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CHAPTERS 
Who should take the lead? 
Government restructuring in New Zealand is shifting many functions from central to regional 
jurisdiction. This section addresses jurisdiction over soil conservation programs. 
5.1 Central government 
Central government is ostensibly responsible for advancing the general health, welfare, and 
prosperity of the entire nation. In most developed countries this responsibility includes conserving 
natural resources and protecting environmental quality. 
Among government units, central government has a comparative advantage in the collection of 
revenues (Oates, 1972). Citizens and businesses can relocate to low rate jurisdictions within a nation 
more easily than they can relocate to low tax nations. High local taxes promote out-migration and 
undercut the tax base. The usual solution to this revenue problem is to collect taxes centrally but 
administer the funds locally. 
Central government is also best placed to devise institutions through which diverse regions can settle 
their differences. One important category of problems involves inter-regional commerce. By 
preventing trade barriers among regions central government promotes specialisation that lowers 
costs and increases economic welfare. Another important category is environmental problems. 
Where pollution travels from one jurisdiction to another, central government provides a forum for 
negotiating and enforcing a solution. 
Central government also has a comparative advantage in the provision of basic information and 
research. Businesses and smaller jurisdictions often cannot capture all of the benefits and so have 
less incentive to provide these goods. 
Finally, central government has an advantage in pooling the risks of major disasters. At the local 
or regional level, disasters are rare and difficult to predict. Resources set aside for relief may go 
unused for decades. At the national level, disasters occur with greater frequency and it is easier to 
justify having relief resources constantly at hand. This is not to say that government deals with risks 
more efficiently than the private sector or that local entities are unimportant in the implementation 
of relief programs. But, if the public sector is to be involved, centralisation of resources has some 
advantages . 
. How do the advantages of central government relate to soil and water conservation? First, they 
suggest merit in national environmental quality objectives - minimum conditions to which the 
citizens of all regions are entitled and which will not be hostage to covert inter-regional economic 
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competition.19 For example, central government could set specific minimum nationwide water 
quality criteria, or it could reduce the share of national tax revenues going to a region that fails to 
adopt certain minimum standards. 
Second, central government can establish uniform protocols for information about natural resourceS 
and environmental quality. Standardised, long-term data are important for monitoring resource 
trends, conducting research, and assessing policies. In order to ensure the quality and consistency 
of data collection, central government may have to pay for these services or maintain staff in all 
regions. 
Third, central government can support basic natural resource research of national significance. 
Fourth, as the logical government provider of basic disaster relief, central government can make 
suitable connections between disaster policies and soil and water conservation. 
Finally, central government can use its fiscal advantage to collect a significant share of the 
government funds for conservation policies. It obviously should fund the programs over which it 
assumes primacy - water quality standards, for example, but also can use national funds to reduce 
fiscal barriers to regional policy development. 
S.2 Regional government 
The chief advantage of regional government is its proximity to local interests and concerns 
(Oates, 1972). It can tailor national objectives to meet local needs, and it can establish policies and 
programs for special regional circumstances. 
Regional government's overriding responsibility is to promote the welfare of citizens within its 
jurisdiction. This sometimes involves competition with other regions for economic or political 
resources held by central government. The competition can occasio'nally be destructive. One region 
may be reluctant to regulate pollution, for example, because industry might relocate and remove 
jobs, income, and government revenue from the region (Rowland and Mallz, 1982). In many such 
instances, the regions would all be better off with a common set of basic protections, which is where 
central government plays a vital role. 
Water quality standards provide an example. Regions can compete for industrial development by 
cheapening their water resources. Efforts to set some common protections for water probably await 
the action of central government, if only to insist that all regions establish their own standards. 
19 On the potential for competition, see: Rowland and Maoz (1982) and Leonard (1988). 
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Regions probably have more autonomy with land use standards, because the inherent capabilities 
of land are immobile. Moreover, in the long run, a region that enhances its inherent productive 
capacity will have a stronger economic base, so a region has a competitive interest in minimising 
degradation. Education and extension to promote the consideration of land quality information in 
land markets and consultancies are examples of initiatives that regions could reasonably undertake. 
While regions stand to gain relatively through such programs, their investments also serve the 
national interest in remaining competitive internationally. Thus, it would make sense to use national 
funds to promote regional conservation policies - perhaps through central government grants for 
policy development followed by matching grants for program operations. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Summary and assessment 
Four of the policy instruments identified above seem worthy of serious consideration: facilitation 
and information support, cross-compliance with disaster assistance, standards for water quality, and 
liability. 
Liability is the starting point. Through common law remedies, private citizens can reinforce the 
duties and obligations of landholders to prevent off-site damages. Government can playa role by 
making those remedies more accessible. Access will be enhanced by setting suitable evidentiary 
standards for non-point source pollution, by establishing liberal grounds for class actions, and by 
expanding the applicable liability doctrines (Miceli and Segerson, forthcoming). 
While they are a starting point, common law remedies are unlikely to resolve ,adequately soil and 
water degradation, for the reasons outlined above. Other instruments more actively involve 
government. 
Disaster relief for farmers has been a major policy quandary in recent years. Large sums have been 
expended to rejuvenate farms in highly vulnerable areas; areas that may never be stabilised unless 
farming gives way to forestry. Moreover, agriculture's disproportionate claim on disaster aid is 
difficult to justify. 
A political intention to continue special disaster relief for farmers could at least attach conservation 
as a quid pro quo. Farmers whose resource management is not certifiably conservative could be 
excluded from the extra assistance. Further research is needed to assess farmers' willingness to 
participate in such a scheme, the cost implications and risk management options for government, 
and administrative procedures. 
Water resources are so important in New Zealand that the near-vacuum of criteria for their use is 
surprising and alarming. Water quality standards would set goals against which actual conditions 
can be measured and would be a basis for action when conditions are unacceptable. Periodic 
monitoring, self-reporting, and a complaint process could provide reasonable enforcement. 
Standards would have to be backed up with penalties for noncompliance. 
Regional governments are unlikely to adopt water quality standards that interfere with economic 
competitiveness. Central government needs to define basic criteria that are to be met everywhere. 
Strong programs of basic research and information are essential to expand knowledge of natural 
resources, to solve resource management problems, and to keep all parties informed about the 
quality of resources and improved management possibilities. Central government is the obvious 
leader in this area as well. But, regions can play an important role in seeing that those who 
influence the management of land are well-informed about their self-interest in resource 
conservation. They can also use their, role in land transfers to expedite changes that will promote 
conservation. 
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The preceding instruments have sound economic and public policy justifications. But, in reality, they 
are only part of the picture. New Zealand is one of many nations that employs land use standards, 
despite the less obvious public policy rationale. 
Land use standards can be useful in providing guidelines for landholders. Not all landholders fit the 
'rational' model that predicts idealised behaviour which will yield appropriate conservation. Some 
landholders will do more than needed, some less. And few will make the extra effort to mitigate off-
site impacts. On the other hand, bureaucrats are unlikely to be better at determining the 'best' land 
management techniques. It would be unwise to harness the rural landscape in the constraints of 
traditional patterns of centralised planning. Rather, the best use of land use standards is as a last 
resort to resolve especially egregious problems without the necessity to prove specific connections 
to off-site problems or rely on private recourse through common law. 
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